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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5331
Microfinance is often criticized for not adequately 
addressing seasonality and hard-core poverty. In 
Bangladesh, a program known as PRIME was introduced 
in 2006 to address both concerns. Unlike regular 
microfinance, PRIME introduces a microfinance 
scheme that offers a flexible repayment schedule and 
consumption smoothing, as well as production, loans. It 
targets the ultra-poor, many of whom are also seasonally 
poor, with a severe inability to smooth consumption 
during certain months of the year. Besides providing 
This paper—a product of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to understand the role of micro-finance in agriculture growth and poverty reduction. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at skhandker@worldbank.org.  
loans, PRIME offers extension and training services. 
This paper uses a quasi-experimental survey design to 
evaluate PRIME against regular microfinance programs. 
The results show that PRIME is more effective than 
regular microfinance in reaching the ultra-poor, as well 
as the seasonal poor. PRIME also helps reduce seasonal 
deprivation and extreme poverty. Although the program 
has demonstrated its promise, it is too early to conclude 
whether the accrued benefits are large enough to contain 
both seasonal and chronic poverty on a sustained basis.    
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1.    Introduction 
Microfinance is part of a strategy to mitigate the moral hazard problems of lending by 
adopting innovative methods such as group-based lending.
2  It is also a strategy to reduce 
poverty by targeting the poor, who are often excluded by regular financial institutions 
because of a lack of sufficient physical collateral.  In recent decades, microfinance has 
successfully reached a large percentage of the poor, especially women.  Yet it has not 
reached as many ultra-poor as one would like to include among its clientele (Webb, Coates, 
and Houser 2002; Datta 2004).
3  
  Bangladesh is a good example.  Despite the country’s overwhelmingly large 
proportion of ultra-poor, microfinance reaches not more than 20 percent (Khandker 1998, 
2005).  While a recent survey found coverage as high as 40 percent in certain areas of the 
country (InM 2009), service coverage of marginal and small farmers is small, with agriculture 
representing only about 10–15 percent of the microfinance lending portfolio.  Also 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) have limited coverage in such areas as the northwest region 
                                                       
2 Besides covariate risk, rural lending is subject to problems of asymmetric information, incentive to repay, and 
enforcing loan contracts (Stiglitz 1990).   
3 Although the terms ultra-poor, extreme poor, and hard-core poor are often used interchangeably, for targeting 
purposes, MFIs specifically designate the ultra-poor based on landholdings, income, and employment as 
defined in section 2 of this paper.   3
of Bangladesh, which is characterized by pronounced seasonality of agriculture and higher 
incidence of extreme poverty compared to other areas of the country (Khandker 2009).
 4,5    
   Microfinance does not usually provide agricultural lending in Bangladesh.  Rather, 
the poor access microcredit to initiate income-earning activities in rural non-farm sectors.  A 
major reason for microcredit program participation is to help facilitate consumption 
smoothing.  Households unable to smooth consumption due to income seasonality are more 
likely to participate in microcredit programs, which promote income-earning activities in 
rural non-farm sectors that are less vulnerable to seasonality; in this way, borrowers are 
helped to smooth consumption and thus reduce vulnerability to consumption (Pitt and 
Khandker 2002; Zaman 1999, 2004).  Moreover, if gains from microfinance are not large, it 
is shown that microcredit can reduce extreme poverty more than moderate poverty 
(Khandker 2005).   
   The question then arises: Why do we see a small share of the microfinance portfolio 
in such areas as the northwest region, which features pronounced income seasonality?  Why 
does a small percentage of the ultra-poor participate in microfinance?  Does income 
seasonality reinforce extreme poverty and, as a result, the limited coverage of microfinance 
in the northwest region?  Does it mean a microfinance program different from what is 
currently available is needed to handle both income seasonality and hard-core poverty?   
In recent years, with donor assistance and under government pressure, some MFIs in 
Bangladesh have introduced a variety of programs to better handle seasonality and hard-core 
poverty.  In 2002, BRAC, Bangladesh’s leading nongovernmental organization (NGO), 
                                                       
4 The northwest region of Bangladesh consists of five districts in greater Rangpur: Rangpur Sadar, Gaibandha, 
Nilphamari, Lalmonirhat, and Kurigarm. The terms northwest region and greater Rangpur region are used 
interchangeably throughout this paper.  
5 In 2005, only 12 percent of villages in the northwest region of Bangladesh had a Grameen Bank, compared to 
34 percent in other regions of the country.  It should be noted that the northwest region is the worst hit in 
terms of the negative consequences of extreme seasonality of agriculture.       4
launched a multidimensional microcredit program targeting the ultra-poor (Matin and Hulme 
2003; Emran, Robano, and Smith 2009).
6  The BRAC ultra-poor program emphasizes both 
human and physical capital development via transferring assets and other means, such as 
skills-based training before the ultra-poor graduate to become members of its regular 
microfinance program.  Similar ultra-poor programs introduced by Grameen Bank target the 
ultra-poor, such as beggars.  Many MFIs, including Grameen Bank, have introduced seasonal 
loans as part of their regular microfinance programs to address seasonality of income.   
Addressing hard-core poverty or pronounced seasonality of income is a formidable 
task for any institution, let alone a microfinance or financial institution.  When poverty is 
already rampant, pronounced seasonality of income and consumption only makes it worse.  
Therefore, tackling both seasonality and poverty with a single intervention, such as 
microfinance, is a major challenge for policy makers (Khandker 2009). 
In 2006, the Program Initiatives for Monga Eradication (PRIME) was introduced by 
the Palli Karma Shahayak Foundation (PKSF), the country’s premier wholesale MFI.
7  
PRIME’s objective is to deal exclusively with the hard-core poor, who are highly vulnerable 
to seasonal poverty, especially in the northwest region.  PRIME offers the ultra-poor 
microcredit and other services on flexible terms.  
   Extreme poverty is caused by unfavorable agroclimatic conditions and low levels of 
physical and human capital.  Seasonal poverty is caused when households cannot smooth 
consumption across seasons because regular income is received only in certain seasons.   
Lack of consumption smoothing is more pronounced for the poor than for the rich.  A large 
body of literature shows that the observed seasonality in consumption is driven mainly by 
the seasonal variation in income and lack of access to credit impedes consumption 
                                                       
6 Evaluations of such programs indicate that BRAC’s ultra-poor program has desirable impacts on the poor.  
7 The term monga means seasonal food deprivation.   5
smoothing, often among the poor (Rosenzweig 1988; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; 
Chaudhuri and Paxson 2002; Paxson 1993).  However, if the risk is idiosyncratic (i.e., 
specific to certain households), then local risk pooling or insurance is feasible, which 
becomes limited in the event of an aggregate shock (Townsend 1995).  Better access to 
finance is a useful approach for better allocation of resources (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
1993).  Pitt and Khandker (2002) find that production credit helps smooth seasonal 
consumption by financing new productive activities whose “income flows and time demands 
do not seasonally co-vary with income generated by existing activities of households.”  
If lack of access to credit causes households not to smooth consumption or allocate 
resources efficiently, then both seasonal and hard-core poverty are caused, in part, by a lack 
of access to credit.  Introducing a microfinance program targeted to the hard-core poor with 
a program designed to tackle pronounced income seasonality is thus expected to make a 
dent in reducing seasonal and chronic poverty.  The key research question is whether such a 
program as PRIME can achieve both aims.     
The objective of this paper is to evaluate PRIME in terms of its effectiveness in 
reaching the ultra-poor and reducing seasonal and extreme poverty.  Specifically, the paper 
(i) evaluates the extent to which PRIME’s flexible microfinance program has been effective 
in reaching the ultra-poor and seasonally poor, (ii) quantifies program benefits in terms of 
mitigating extreme and seasonal poverty, and (iii) assesses the relative effectiveness of 
PRIME and regular microfinance in reducing extreme and seasonal poverty.    
Section 2 discusses the poverty and seasonality of the northwest region vis-à-vis 
other regions and the rationale for the PRIME intervention.  Section 3 presents an economic 
framework that lays out the role of credit in resolving income seasonality and extreme 
poverty.  This section also discusses an empirical framework to estimate the effects of a   6
credit intervention.  Section 4 discusses the data, which are drawn from a random household 
survey carried out in program and non-program villages.  Both cross-sectional and panel data 
are used to evaluate the role of PRIME in mitigating seasonality and hard-core poverty.  As 
PRIME is a special microfinance program, it is essential to evaluate it against regular 
microfinance.  Section 5 presents the data in terms of the ultra-poor’s participation in 
PRIME vis-à-vis regular microfinance and analyzes the factors responsible for the 
participation of the ultra-poor in one of the programs.  Section 6 reviews the methods and 
results and program effects on household welfare using cross-sectional data.  Section 7 then 
discusses the methods and results using panel data.  Section 8 provides a summary and 
policy conclusion.       
 
2.  Tackling Seasonal and Extreme Poverty in the Northwest with PRIME 
The first goal outlined in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
focuses on reducing poverty and hunger.  The World Bank has vigorously promoted all 
member countries to attain this goal.  The Government of Bangladesh has undertaken 
various steps toward achieving the MDGs and had made significant progress.  Recent figures 
suggest Bangladesh’s achievements.  Compared to the baseline poverty of 58.8 percent in 
1990, the poverty rate in 2000 was 49.6 percent, roughly equivalent to a 1-percent poverty 
reduction per year (United Nations 2005).  Results of the 2005 Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (HIES) show even more gains in poverty reduction: The overall poverty 
rate in 2005 was 40 percent countrywide, with 28.4 percent in urban and 43.8 percent in 
rural areas (Table 1).  Over the 2000–05 periods, the rate of poverty reduction was about 2 
percent per year.   7
Bangladesh’s impressive performance in poverty reduction, however, is not uniform 
across the country; although overall poverty has declined, the incidence of poverty is much 
higher in lagging regions (greater Rangpur).  For example, HIES findings suggest that, while 
the rural poverty-headcount rate nationwide was 43.8 percent in 2005, the greater Rangpur 
(northwest) region had a rural poverty rate of 57.4 percent (Table 1).  Incidence of extreme 
poverty was also much higher in the northwest (43 percent) than the nationwide rural 
average (28.6 percent).   
Figure 1, which shows per capita monthly consumption at 18 points during the year 
(spaced at 20-day intervals), suggests that (i) household consumption per capita is much 
lower in the northwest than in other regions year round and (ii) seasonal fluctuation in 
expenditures is greater in the northwest than in the rest of the country (Khandker 2009).  
The northwest region also experiences a sharp shortfall in food consumption during certain 
months of the year, which produces cyclical food insecurity. 
 
                Source: HIES survey, 2005. 
Figure 1: Distribution of per capita expenditure 
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Seasonal deprivation of food, locally known as monga, occurs from mid-September to 
mid-November, corresponding to the post-planting to pre-harvesting period of Aman rice.  
This is the lean period for both consumption and labor demand, with few opportunities to 
employ the poor in agriculture.  Monga does not imply a lack of availability of food but rather 
the lack of access and utilization of food (WFP 2005).  Lack of access to food is due to a 
lack of income, along with higher prices for basic foods, which often occurs during monga.  
Lack of income is essentially due to lack of employment during the pre-harvest season.  
Seasonal deprivation is thus due to the working of an economic system that limits the ability 
of a segment of the population in acquiring food and other basic necessities (Sen 1981).
8   
   Monga is most pronounced in greater Rangpur, owing to this northwest region’s 
ecological and economic vulnerability (Rahman 1995).  Monga affects those rural poor who 
have an undiversified income that directly or indirectly depends on agriculture (Zug 2006).  
Women and children are affected disproportionately due to intra-household inequity in 
resource allocation. 
Those who suffer from seasonal deprivation are mostly the hard-core poor, who 
have few assets and scarce savings with which to smooth consumption during the lean 
period.  Because they lack access to credit markets, they are unable to borrow against future 
income.  Without well-functioning credit markets, households frequently attempt to smooth 
consumption during monga by drawing on informal credit-market arrangements, known 
locally as dadan.  Under these arrangements, laborers sell labor or farmers sell crops in 
advance on terms that are often severe.  Households also employ traditional self-insurance 
methods of coping, such as use of buffer stock (livestock and grain storage), and mutual 
                                                       
8 Bangladesh’s agriculture sector is characterized by three crop seasons (based on three types of rice): Aus, 
Aman, and Boro.  While these three crops cover the entire year, there is virtually no economic activity during the 
monga period, with no alternate agricultural activity.  The non-farm sector is not large enough to hire the 
unemployed, who are mostly agricultural laborers and small farmers.     9
insurance, such as inter-family transfers.  But for many households these traditional methods 
of smoothing consumption are inadequate and inefficient.   
Government institutions employ short-term measures, such as cash transfers, food-
for-work, food coupons, and public works to manage monga.  If variations in consumption 
are only transitory and idiosyncratic across households, these interventions may help mitigate 
monga.  However, monga is widespread and results from structural poverty caused by low 
income, low productivity, and lack of diversification of local economies.  Thus, interventions 
not geared toward enhancing income and productivity are of little help in containing monga 
on a sustainable basis.  
Group-based lending as practiced by government and nongovernmental institutions 
appears to have limited scope in mitigating monga on a sustainable basis for various reasons.  
First, microfinance has not reached the ultra-poor, who are hard hit by seasonality of income 
and consumption.  Second, the weekly repayment schedule is at odds with seasonality of 
income and employment, which also inhibits the ultra-poor’s participation in microfinance.  
Third, activities generating seasonality of income often limit the ability of microcredit 
agencies to support new loans during lean seasons.  Finally, group-based lending works well 
when income variations are idiosyncratic so that group members assist/insure each other 
through difficult times.  But when seasonality is systematic, affecting everyone in a group, 
the ability of mutual insurance is severely curtailed, and the group as a whole has a greater 
incentive to collude on a strategy of default.  Thus, microfinance is not well suited to address 
either hard-core poverty or seasonality of poverty.  It is little wonder that microfinance has 
only recently extended its reach in the northwest region.   
   In  2006, the PKSF and its partners introduced PRIME to address seasonal 
deprivation and ultra-poverty in the northwest region.  As mentioned above, PRIME offers   10
a flexible microfinance program that includes both production and consumption loans and 
specifically targets the ultra-poor.  Unlike regular microfinance, PRIME has a flexible 
repayment schedule, a production loan can be used for consumption if needed, the interest 
rate is not more than 10 percent (compared to 20 percent for regular microfinance), and no 
fixed savings or weekly meetings are stipulated.  In addition to flexible microfinance, PRIME 
offers year-round services to support income-generating activities, skills-based training, 
remittances, and primary health care (InM 2009).  During the monga season, PRIME also 
provides emergency loans for consumption smoothing and cash for work related to local 
infrastructure development.  However, PRIME does not offer consumption credit without 
either subsequent or prior production credit.   
  The target beneficiaries of PRIME are the ultra-poor, identified based on a village 
census prior to the program intervention using the following criteria: (i) households have 
strictly less than 50 decimals of land; (ii) household per capita monthly income does not 
exceed Tk1,500 (equivalent to US$25) and (iii) one household member is a daily wage 
worker.  The pre-program intervention data collected by the PKSF in 2006 reveals that, in 
listing the households for PRIME intervention, eligibility conditions are strictly enforced.  
PRIME is worthy of a rigorous impact evaluation, which must determine whether the 
intervention is effective in reaching the hard-core poor, as well as mitigating both seasonal 
and hard-core poverty.  
  Important to the identification of appropriate policies is an understanding of the 
extent of the seasonal nature of poverty vis-à-vis chronic poverty.  While transient or 
seasonal poverty may be addressed by offering credit and bolstering other safety nets that 
stabilize income and consumption, the roots of chronic poverty are deeper and must be 
addressed through long-term investments in human and physical capital (Jalan and Ravallion   11
2000; Khandker 2009).  Therefore, the evaluation of PRIME must examine whether the 
provision of credit, along with other non-financial services, is capable of addressing both the 
human and physical capital needs of the ultra-poor for mitigating seasonal and hard-core 
poverty in a sustainable way. 
    
3.  Role of Credit in Seasonal and Hard-core Poverty: An Analytical Framework  
Theory 
We follow a standard inter-temporal utility maximization model of consumption smoothing 
and present the implications of borrowing restrictions following Deaton (1991).  Each 
household i is to maximize the following utility function, which is assumed to be increasing, 
strictly concave, and differentiable.  
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where  
ci = a single aggregate consumption good and  
β = the time discount rate.   
This is maximized subject to the following dynamic asset constraint: 
) )( 1 ( 1 it it it it c y A r A            ( 2 )  
where  
yit = labor income that is risky,   
Ait = real assets, and   
r  = real interest rate (assumed fixed over time).     12
If t is large enough and Ait+1 = 0, from the Euler equations, the standard permanent income 
result of the marginal utility of current consumption is then equal to the discounted expected 
marginal utility of future consumption; that is, 
   ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1      it it c u E r c u        ( 3 )  
With borrowing restrictions, we must add another constraint to the consumer’s decision, 
reflecting that assets can never be negative: 
   0  it A        ( 4 )  
If the credit constraint binds, then the equality of (3) will be violated and households will fail 
to smooth consumption.   
For simplicity, if we assume that the utility function is quadratic and the rate of time 
preference equal to the interest rate, then, in the absence of a binding credit constraint, there 
would be perfect consumption smoothing; that is, cit = cit+1.  When the credit constraint is 
binding, cit < cit+1.  
Figure 2 illustrates the consequences of a binding credit constraint in a two-period 
decision model, with period 0 representing the lean season and period 1 the harvest season.  
In the absence of a credit constraint, a household would maximize its inter-temporal utility 
by consuming at e0.  With the binding credit constraint, the household would face a 
discontinuous budget line, such as q0e1c1; it would then be forced to consume at e1, with a 
lower lean-period consumption (c1 < c0) and would be at a lower welfare curve than before.  
Even if the period 1 (harvest season) income were to rise, it would have no impact on period 
0 (lean season) consumption.  
      13
 
Figure 2: Lean- and harvest-period consumption with a credit constraint 
 
  Moreover, if the consumption point represented by e0 implies the minimum bundle 
of goods households ought to consume to stay above the extreme poverty line, one can 
argue that having no access to credit to smooth consumption would force households to 
consume much less than what is needed to maintain the threshold point.  Therefore, without 
access to credit, households would likely fall into both seasonal and extreme poverty.   
Conversely, improved access to credit helps households to both smooth consumption and 
approach or move above the extreme poverty line.  More importantly, improved access to 
credit can shift the budget curve upward, thus helping households move above the poverty 
line (i.e., above consumption point e1).  If this happens, one can argue that access to credit 
helps not only to smooth consumption but also reduce poverty.  For example, a shift of the 
budget curve to q2p2 yields a consumption level denoted by e2, meaning a higher level of 
welfare that lifts households out of extreme, as well as seasonal, poverty.   
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   The central hypothesis of this seasonal consumption model is that improving access 
to credit enhances seasonal income and the lean-period consumption level to help a 
household smooth consumption during lean period.  Moreover, if the credit impact is large, 
it would have also a positive effect on the non-lean period.  Thus, if households were credit 
constrained, such interventions as PRIME could make credit available to smooth 
consumption by providing alternative income and employment opportunities to enhance 
income both in the lean and non-lean periods.  The policy question is whether the credit 
provision of a project such as PRIME—in contrast to a regular microfinance program, 
which also aims to enhance the income and consumption of poor borrowers—can 
effectively shift the budget curve upward so that ultra-poor households smooth 
consumption and allocate their resources more efficiently to reach higher consumption 
goals.    
Model specification and estimation strategy 
We assume that the status of household consumption for a particular season (s) can be 
represented by the following regression: 
ijs j ij ij ij ijs p x y                        (5) 
where 
yijs = consumption status of household i living in village j in season s,  
x = a vector of household and community characteristics,  
p = status of credit program participation, and  
α, β, and γ = unknown parameters to be estimated.   
The outcomes observed for a cross-section of households can be observed for two major 
groups in a given season: (i) otherwise non-poor households that have a lower consumption 
level due to a binding credit constraint in the lean period and (ii) otherwise poor households   15
that have an even lower consumption level due to a binding credit constraint in the lean 
period.  When evaluating a program that targets a group of seasonally poor households, a 
number of factors are likely to affect the participation decision of a particular household.  
Thus, participation (p) is not exogenous but, as equation (6) shows, is determined by a 
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The errors between equations (5) and (6) are likely to be correlated.  At least three 
types of errors may affect the outcomes of interest (e.g., consumption status in a given 
season or program participation for a cross-section of households interviewed): (i) 
unobserved household characteristics (μ), (ii) unobserved village characteristics (η), and (iii) 
idiosyncratic errors (ξ) randomly distributed with zero mean and unit variance.     
The errors are correlated for several reasons.  First, there may be unobserved village 
hetereogeneity (η)—such characteristics as remoteness, infrastructure, and attitudes—which 
affects both participation (i.e., the amounts borrowed by households) and its effect on 
outcome variables.  Second, there may be unobserved household or individual heterogeneity 
(μ))—such unmeasured characteristics as entrepreneurial drive, preferences, and health 
status—which also affects participation and its effect.  Third, there may be endogenous 
program placement.  That is, a program such as PRIME does not select villages randomly 
for program placement; rather, such factors as extent of seasonal famine or river erosion 
determine the decision to place PRIME in a particular village.  These attributes that 
influence program placement, measured by η, may also contribute to lower levels of 
household consumption.   
  The correlated errors of equations (5) and (6) do not arise if a program is randomly 
placed and households are randomly selected between participant and non-participant.  In   16
such a randomized framework, a simple comparison of post-intervention outcomes between 
participants and non-participants is a measure of program effect.
9  In contrast, when a non-
randomized evaluation method is adopted, it is important to account for these correlations 
or endogeneity in program assessment; otherwise, the results will be biased.  There are 
alternative non-experimental methods that may be relevant to assess program effects.  Using 
a particular method in a program evaluation would ultimately depend on available data and 
its characteristics (e.g., whether the data is drawn from a cross-sectional or panel survey 
(Ravallion 2006; Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad 2009).  Although randomization is beyond 
the scope of this study, we use non-experimental design based on both cross-sectional and 
panel surveys to estimate the effects of PRIME vis-à-vis regular microfinance on seasonality 
of income and consumption, as well as hunger and poverty. 
  
4.   Survey Data and Its Characteristics 
The available data to evaluate PRIME comes from a survey conducted by the Institute of 
Microfinance (InM).  PKSF carried out a pre-intervention data-collection survey to identify 
its target group for PRIME.  Along with its partner organizations (POs), PKSF conducted a 
village census that listed households to determine which were ultra-poor and which were 
also vulnerable to seasonal food deprivation.  The ultra-poor were then selected based on 
the previously mentioned criteria.
10  After identifying the ultra-poor target households of 
PRIME using these criteria and focus group meetings, a small survey questionnaire was 
administered by the PKSF and its POs with the help of the InM (who designed the survey 
                                                       
9 The PKSF has not allowed the InM to do a random design of PRIME program evaluation.  
10 This is the overriding eligibility condition of regular microfinance as practiced in Bangladesh.  The ultra-poor, 
who have much less than 50 decimals of land, also belong to this target group; however, given the program 
design, which includes maintaining a weekly repayment schedule and attending weekly meetings, the ultra-poor 
often find it difficult to participate in regular microfinance programs.      17
and trained PO staff in how to collect information) prior to program intervention.  The data 
set may be considered as a baseline for any evaluation of PRIME intervention.  This baseline 
survey was conducted in December 2006 immediately following the lean season.  The 
baseline data was analyzed for various research topics, such as vulnerability, coping, and 
seasonal migration (Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2009).  
 The  monga-vulnerable, ultra-poor households were offered the PRIME program 
through 235 PRIME branches in 5 districts of the northwest region.
11  The intervention was 
first implemented in Lalmonirhat district in 2006 and in the other 4 districts (Rangpur, 
Kurigram, Gaibandha, and Nilphamari) the following year.  PRIME beneficiaries meet in 
small groups of 25–30 each at a mutually agreed time and place.  However, unlike regular 
microfinance, PRIME groups may save any amount of money and are qualified for a loan 
against any amount of savings.  PRIME groups receive loans and other benefits for both 
year-round and specific lean-period activities, such as consumption-smoothing loans.  Year-
round activities include a flexible microcredit program that allows loans for production and 
consumption, with a repayment schedule convenient for borrowers.  PRIME also offers 
extension services for income-generating activities, training, primary health care, and 
remittance services.     
Between December 2008 and February 2009 a detailed survey was administered by 
InM that sampled target households to assess the impact of PRIME.  A multi-stage cluster 
sampling technique was used to draw a random sample of 4,589 households from 16 
upazilas, 61 unions, and 271 villages from the total area that received the intervention.   
Interestingly, not all selected households eligible for the PRIME intervention were 
                                                       
11 Greater Rangpur’s 5 districts include 34 upazilas (subdistricts).  In its first phase, the PRIME intervention 
targets 23 upazilas (covering 482,948 households), 209 unions, and 2,531 villages (InM 2009).  A second phase, 
beginning in early 2010, covers the remaining 11 upazilas.    18
participating at the time of the second interview (two years after program intervention 
began).  Moreover, some randomly sampled households from PRIME catchment villages 
participated in regular microfinance.         
   In addition to this sample survey of households, the InM carried out a similar survey 
in areas of 3 districts that were targeted for the PRIME intervention by 2010, but had not 
received it by 2008–09.  Out of 11 upazilas in 3 districts, 4 were selected as control upazilas.  
Out of 40 villages in these 4 upazilas not yet covered under PRIME, 27 were selected from 
which 618 PRIME-eligible households were randomly drawn based on the village census.  
Thus, the total sample of households selected for the study was 5,207, of which 1,520 
participated in PRIME, 1,718 participated in regular microfinance, and 1,968 did not 
participate in any program. 
  Table 2 shows the distribution of 5,207 households by program participation status 
and by district in the greater Rangpur region.  The sample distribution was further 
disaggregated by PRIME and non-PRIME areas.  Three groups were identified by program 
participation status: PRIME-only, regular microfinance only and non-participants (in 
PRIME, non-PRIME, or control villages).
12  In all areas, 33 percent of target households 
were regular microcredit program participants, 29.2 percent PRIME participants, and 37.8 
percent non-participants.   
    In PRIME areas, the shares of PRIME participants, regular microfinance 
participants, and non-participants were 33.2, 33.8 and 33.0 respectively.  In non-PRIME 
villages, 26.5 percent of the ultra-poor participated in regular microfinance programs while 
73.5 percent were non-participants.        
                                                       
12 Although non-participants may include non-eligible households from PRIME or control villages, they were 
not sampled in these surveys.    19
  Although Lalmonirhat district received PRIME treatment the earliest, Kurigram 
district had the highest percentage of PRIME participants, followed by Nilphamari, 
Lalmonirhat, Rangpur, and Gaibandha (Table 2).  Interestingly, Lalmonirhat has high 
participation in regular microfinance programs (36.9 percent), second only to Gaibandha.   
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of major outcomes by program participation 
status, while Table 4 shows those of household and community characteristics by program 
participation status for the 2008–09 survey of 5,207 households.  Of particular importance 
are the poverty and seasonal deprivation measures.  Three measures of poverty are calculated 
and presented in Table 3: moderate poverty, food poverty, and extreme poverty.
13  The two 
poverty measures (moderate and extreme poverty) are calculated using the year-round 
consumption data.  In contrast, the measure of food poverty is calculated using food 
consumption during the week preceding the interview, which occurred during the non-monga 
season (December–February).  The extent of poverty of all three dimensions is about the 
same for all three household categories.  For example, the share of moderate poverty is 86.1 
percent among the regular microfinance participants, compared to 87.1 percent among 
PRIME participants and 89.2 percent among non-participants.  By contrast, among regular 
microcredit programs, 67.6 percent are extremely poor, compared to 67.5 percent among 
PRIME participants and 72.7 percent among non-participants; that is, among the targeted 
                                                       
13 Poverty measures indicate the proportion (or percentage) of households in a sample or population that 
cannot meet certain predefined welfare requirements called poverty lines.  The food poverty line is based on a 
food basket needed to maintain the per-capita daily caloric requirement (2,120 calories) recommended by the 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) (FAO and WHO 
1973).  For rural Bangladesh, the food basket includes mostly rice and other food items including pulses, milk, 
meat, fish, fruits, and vegetables in specific quantities.  The cost of such a food basket (food poverty line) is 
calculated using local food prices.  The non-food poverty line is estimated as 30 percent of the food poverty 
line.  Together, these two poverty lines constitute the moderate poverty line.  Thus, moderate poverty and food 
poverty are defined by the proportions of households whose total and food expenditures cannot meet the 
respective poverty lines, while extreme poverty is the dire situation that results when a household’s total 
expenditure cannot even meet the food poverty line.       20
ultra-poor, participants in both regular and PRIME microcredit programs are slightly better 
off than non-participants.  
Among the ultra-poor households, about 85 percent are food poor, 88 percent are 
moderately poor, and 70 percent are extremely poor.  This means that some ultra-poor 
households have food poverty, but are not extremely poor.    
   The three measures of poverty just discussed are objective measures of welfare based 
on actual consumption data.  We have also constructed two subjective measures of welfare 
based on the extent of reported occasional starvation (i.e., no meal in some days) or meal 
rationing (skipping a meal or two some days) by households.  Starvation is an extreme form 
of food deprivation, while meal rationing is a more moderate type of deprivation  
As Table 3 shows, the year-round subjective measure of food deprivation (either 
starvation or meal rationing) is 94.5 percent for all households, compared to 85.4 percent 
food poverty among the same households.  Although the objective measure of food 
deprivation indicates less hardship than the subjective measure, it is not inconsistent as the 
objective measure has been constructed using food intake during the post-monga harvest 
period while the subjective measure refers to food consumption during both the monga and 
non-monga periods.  But the high correlation between the two measures suggests that most 
households who are food poor are likely to starve or skip meals at certain times, either on a 
daily or weekly basis.
14  That is, the majority of the ultra-poor are likely to be food poor any 
time of the year.       
  The ultra-poor are also similar in terms of observed characteristics (Table 4).   
Households have a low level of education and have small or negligible amounts of 
                                                       
14 Since actual consumption data is expensive to collect on a regular basis, one can collect these subjective 
measures of food deprivation at low cost to monitor changes in welfare status following an intervention, such 
as PRIME.    21
landholdings and non-land assets.  Their average landholding is 15.9 decimals.  Only 6.5 
percent who meet the eligibility conditions by income or wage employment have 
landholdings exceeding 50 decimals.  We also find that PRIME participants are more 
resource poor than non-participants and those who participate in regular microcredit 
programs are better off than PRIME participants and non-participants. 
  Table 4 also shows the sample population distribution by village infrastructure.  It 
shows that PRIME programs serve villages that are less developed, compared to those 
served by the regular microfinance programs.  For example, some 62 percent of participants 
in regular microfinance programs come from villages that have access to paved roads, 
compared to only 46 percent of PRIME participants, who are from similar villages.  Seventy 
percent of PRIME participants come from villages that have the Grameen Bank.  On the 
other hand, 83 percent of regular microfinance participants come from villages that also 
have PRIME access.  Most of the villages under study have some type of safety net program.  
More than 20 percent of households included in the survey come from villages located on 
tiny island fragments, known as chars.
15  However, 95 percent of the sampled households 
come from villages in the highlands.
16 
  Table 5 presents the household distribution by the subjective level of deprivation 
(i.e., starvation, meal rationing, and full meals) and the objective measure of deprivation (i.e., 
moderate, food, and extreme poverty).  Some 48 percent of the moderate poor and 28.8 
percent of the moderate non-poor are subject to starvation during the monga period.  The 
incidence of starvation is highest among the extreme poor (51.8 percent) and lowest among 
the food non-poor during the monga period (20.2 percent).  Overall, the extent of food 
                                                       
15 Created by silt in riverbeds, chars serve as shelters for many destitute people who have almost nothing.  
16 Highlands are defined as land areas either above flood level or flooded up to a 3-ft. depth.   
   22
deprivation (starvation or meal rationing) in both periods is much higher among the poor 
(moderate, extreme, or food poor) than among the non-poor.  This also suggests that the 
subjective measure of deprivation well captures the objective measure of food poverty or 
deprivation.   
         
5.  Does PRIME Reach the Seasonal and Hard-core Poor? 
According to the 2008–09 InM survey, some 62 percent of the ultra-poor in the northwest 
region’s 5 districts participate in some form of microfinance.  Of these, 29 percent are 
PRIME participants, while 33 percent participate in regular microfinance.  However, the 
annual growth rate of participation among the ultra-poor is much lower for regular 
microfinance (3.3 percent) than for PRIME (11.2 percent) (Figure 3).
17   
 
 
                                                       
17 About 6.1 percent of PRIME participation came from those who had participated in regular microfinance.  
Of the 33 percent who participated in regular microfinance, some 14 percent participated before 2006 (the year 
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     Figure 3: Cumulative rate of program participation 
 
  Figure 3 also shows the participation rates of regular microfinance in areas with 
PRIME (MFI1 curve) and without PRIME (MFI2).  Participation in regular microfinance 
gradually increases over time in both PRIME and non-PRIME areas, but participation in 
regular microfinance is much higher in PRIME areas compared to non-PRIME areas.   
PRIME was introduced in areas that already had a higher rate of regular-microfinance 
participation among the ultra-poor.  This is not surprising, given that PKSF’s POs, who 
introduced PRIME, were providers of regular microfinance before PRIME was introduced 
by PKSF.  As PKSF provides grants and loans on better, more flexible terms for PRIME 
than for regular microfinance, the POs understandably introduced PRIME initially in areas 
of their current operation.  Higher participation rates of the ultra-poor with PRIME may 
also reflect greater demand for PRIME services by the ultra-poor.  The PRIME program is 
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Figure 4: Program participation rate by landholding  
 
   If we consider the distribution of ultra-poor participation by landholding, we find 
that the participation rate among the landless (less than 5 decimals in landholdings) is slightly 
higher for PRIME versus regular microfinance (Figure 4).  Some 27 percent of PRIME 
participants are completely landless (0 decimals of landholdings), compared to 26 percent of 
MFI participants.  But the participation rate among the ultra-poor holding up to 25 decimals 
of land is higher in PRIME than non-PRIME areas.  In both types of microfinance, only a 
small percentage of households with more than 50 decimals in landholdings, the official 
threshold for eligibility in most MFIs in Bangladesh, were found to participate in 
microfinance.
18  For PRIME, the eligibility criteria is defined not only by landholdings (less 
than 50 decimals) but also by household members selling labor for wage or household 
monthly incomes of less than Tk1,500 (US$25).   
   The landless group with less than 50 decimals in landholdings represents the bulk of 
microfinance participants (more than 93 percent of PRIME and regular microfinance in 
PRIME areas) (Figure 5).  It appears that PRIME is a well-targeted program that effectively 
reaches the ultra-poor defined by landholdings.
19 
                                                       
18 Only 6 percent of the participants were from this group in both types of programs. 
19 We cannot say so for regular microfinance programs, since we have not full data on participation that may 
contain households not eligible based on landholding.     25
 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of total participants by landholdings  
 
  Is PRIME also a well-designed program to reach the seasonally poor who suffer 
from occasional starvation or experience meal rationing during the lean season?  Since the 
baseline information on seasonal food deprivation was collected before PRIME was 
introduced, we can examine how households varied in program participation by their prior-
program participation status of food deprivation.  Observation of household participation in 
PRIME and MFIs by meal consumption patterns during monga period shows that, regardless 
of its meal-consumption pattern, a household is twice as likely to join PRIME than a regular 
microfinance program, which may be attributable to PRIME’s focus on addressing 
immediate household needs during the lean season (Figure 6).
20 
 
                                                       
20 Households that were MFI members before the PRIME intervention (about 15 percent of panel households) 
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Figure 6: Program participation rate (percent) by pre-intervention,  
food-consumption status  
 
  Given the distribution of 3 household types presented in Table 2 (PRIME, regular 
microfinance, and non-participants), we would like to identify the factors that determine the 
choice of participation in each of these mutually exclusive categories (1 = PRIME, 2 = 
regular microfinance, and 3 = non-participants).  This is done by fitting a maximum-
likelihood multinomial logit (MNL) model.
21   
The objective is to discover what factors (denoted by x) besides program availability 
help the ultra-poor decide to participate in one of the microfinance programs.  The MNL 
results suggest that the explanatory variables (e.g., age and gender of household head, 
                                                       
21 Formally, an MNL model expresses the relative probability of observing a particular value k of outcome Y 





















ik i x x k Y
0 1 0
exp exp ) Pr(                       












20   27
education, landholdings, and other assets) are important in a household’s decision to 
participate in one of the programs (Table 6).  Participants in both PRIME and regular 
microfinance are relatively young.  Education generally has a pronounced negative effect on 
participation in regular microfinance.  However, educated males participate more in regular 
microfinance, while educated females do not participate in PRIME.  While land and non-
land assets matter for participation in regular microfinance, they are irrelevant to PRIME 
participation.  The participation rate in regular microfinance is much lower in villages with 
higher populations and villages with higher male wages, reflecting a negative effect of a large 
local economy.  These factors do not matter for PRIME participation, suggesting that 
PRIME is more pro ultra-poor than is regular microfinance.   
  Village-level infrastructure, such as paved roads and electrification, positively 
influences a household’s decision to participate in a microfinance program.  However, better 
access to markets reduces the probability of PRIME participation among the ultra-poor, 
perhaps because of the availability of alternative employment opportunities.  As expected, 
the presence of any type of microfinance program in a village influences the decision to 
participate.  For example, the probability of participating in regular microfinance is 8.7 
percent among the ultra-poor owing to the Grameen Bank’s presence, compared to 30.2 
percent due to the presence of NGOs.  However, some 36.0 percent of the ultra-poor 
participate in PRIME because of a PRIME intervention.  Thus, PRIME does better than 
regular microfinance in reaching the ultra-poor.  Although the Grameen Bank discourages 
participation in PRIME, this is not the case with NGO programs.      
    Agroclimatic and location-specific factors influence returns to public and private 
investments.  It is little wonder that these factors affect the decision of the ultra-poor to join 
a microfinance program.  Better agroclimatic conditions, such as more rainfall or greater   28
extent of highlands, reduces the probability that the ultra-poor will join a microfinance 
program, perhaps because of the better alternatives available.  Similarly, the probability of 
microfinance participation, especially regular microfinance, is much lower in char villages.  
Thus, regular microfinance programs are not well represented in such areas.   
 
6.  Estimating the Impact of Microfinance Using Cross-sectional Methods 
In recent years, microfinance has incorporated features aimed at mitigating seasonality of 
income, employment, and consumption.  Examples include introducing seasonal loans in the 
regular microfinance setup or consumption loans in a flexible PRIME microfinance setting.  
Given these new program features, we would perhaps expect that microfinance helps to 
reduce seasonality of employment, expenditure, and food consumption, especially during the 
lean season.  Given the proportionally greater participation of the ultra-poor, does 
microfinance, especially PRIME, reduce food deprivation (and other indicators of seasonal 
welfare) among the ultra-poor?  This section uses cross-sectional methods to estimate the 
impacts of microfinance programs on household welfare.   
    The seasonal dimensions of poverty are measured by the seasonality of food 
deprivation (either starvation or meal rationing), seasonality of food and non-food 
expenditure, or seasonality of employment.  By contrast, the chronic or hard-core measure 
of welfare is measured by year-round average monthly employment days, average monthly 
expenditure and income, or year-round measures of food deprivation (moderate, extreme, 
and food poverty).   
  As mentioned previously, the cross-sectional data include three types of ultra-poor 
households based on program participation: (i) PRIME, (ii) regular microfinance, and (iii) 
non-participants.  Non-participants can be further divided into those from villages with or   29
without any type of microfinance program.  This breakdown is used in the so-called pipeline 
method, which estimates program effect by exploiting the variation in timing of program 
implementation, using an eligible comparison group that has not yet received the treatment.  
Thus, the control villages were PRIME target villages where no intervention had occurred by 
the time the InM survey was conducted in 2008–09.  We use a simple pipeline method to 
estimate the program effect of PRIME, as follows:  
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where  
ATT (average treatment effect of treated) = differences of outcomes between program 
participants of treated village (T) and non-participants of control villages (C) adjusted by the 
program participation ratio ( ) in treated villages.  
   Note that equation (7) can be estimated by OLS where treatment dummy (T) is 
assumed exogenous, as follows: 
ij ij ij T y               ( 8 )  
This equation assumes the observational equivalence (both household and village-wise) of 
households that participated and those who did not, except that one group is treated and the 
other is not.   In equation (8),  estimates the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT). 
An obvious shortcoming of the pipeline method is that the timing of program 
placement is not necessarily exogenous but may depend on area characteristics.
22  One way 
to resolve this non-random program placement or participation is to estimate the program 
effect using the propensity score matching (PSM) technique.  PSM requires that PRIME 
participants match with “otherwise identical” non-participants, and quantifies any difference 
                                                       
22 Since PKSF’s POs introduced PRIME initially in areas where they already had regular microfinance 
programs, PRIME placement is not randomly given.   30
in outcome variables between these two groups.  That is, this identification strategy relies on 
observable village- and household-level characteristics to match program participants with 
non-participants.  This reduces potential bias due to the non-randomness of program 
placement and program participation that crop up in the pipeline method.   
   Using the PSM technique, we essentially construct a statistical comparison group 
based on a model of the probability of PRIME participation.  This helps to estimate the 
probability score (p) of participation.  Given the set of observable covariates, x, potential 
outcomes are independent of treatment assignment so that selection is based solely on 
observable characteristics and all variables that influence treatment assignment and potential 
outcomes are simultaneously observed (Ravallion 2006).  We then find, for each participant, 
a sample of non-participants that have similar propensity scores.   
  The average treatment (ATT) of PRIME intervention on y can be expressed as: 
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where  
T
ij y = outcome for PRIME participants,  
C
ij y = outcome for non-participants,  
T N = number of PRIME participants,  
C N = number of matched control households, and 
ij W = associated propensity score-based weight given to control observations in matching 
with the participants.   
    We explore the robustness of these computations using alternative weighting 
schemes (e.g., nearest-neighbor matching or kernel matching) to determine how many non-  31
participant households to include in the control group and how to assign weights to each 
observation (Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad 2009; Ravallion 2006).  An advantage of the 
PSM over the OLS method is that PSM reduces the number of dimensions on which to 
match participants and comparison units.   
Alternatively, we can use a weighted OLS method under the assumption of 
conditional exogeneity (Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder 2003):   
ij ij ij T Y             ( 1 0 )    
with a weight of  P ˆ / 1  for participants and  ) ˆ - 1 ( / 1 P for control observations, where P

is 
the estimated p-score and  ij T is the treatment indicator.  This specification, which attempts 
to control for latent differences across treatment and comparison units that would affect 
selection in program and resulting outcomes, is called the p-weighted regression method. 
  PRIME impacts are estimated using three alternative methods (Table 7).  The 
outcomes of interest are measured as year-round and seasonal.  Pipeline estimates using the 
OLS method are much higher than those obtained using the two PSM methods, whose 
estimates are similar.  It should be noted that the pipeline method compares outcomes 
between PRIME participants in PRIME areas with non-participants from control areas 
(hence a smaller sample of 1,974).  In contrast, the PSM compares outcomes between 
participants matched with non-participants from both PRIME and non-PRIME areas (the 
sample size is 3,388 for the p-score method and 3,490 for the p-weighted regression).      
If we consider the p-weighted OLS estimates shown Table 7, we find that PRIME 
has a positive effect on nearly all annual outcomes.  PRIME increases employment hours, 
especially among females.  It also raises per capita income and reduces seasonal and chronic 
(i.e., year-round) poverty.  More specifically, PRIME participation reduces moderate poverty   32
by 1.9 percentage points, extreme poverty by 4.8 percentage points, and year-round 
starvation by 3.4 percent points.  PRIME also affects seasonal outcomes.  For example, 
during the lean (monga) period, PRIME increases monthly employment by 14.8 percent and 
reduces starvation by 3.4 percentage points.  It also reduces food deprivation by 5.2 
percentage points during non-monga period.  The results clearly suggest that PRIME has 
contributed to reducing both seasonal and chronic poverty among the ultra-poor.       
  Do the effects of PRIME differ from those of regular microfinance?  If we believe 
that PRIME is a better program than regular microfinance for the ultra-poor, then its 
impacts should be greater.  We have just estimated the outcome regression weighted by the 
inverse of participation probability (estimated propensity score) in the case of binary 
treatment.  We can extend this concept to participants of PRIME, regular microfinance, and 
the control group to estimate the relative impacts of PRIME and regular microfinance.  The 
probability of receiving PRIME, regular microfinance, or neither treatment is estimated 
following the MNL estimates shown in Table 6.   
The outcome regression is then weighted as follows: 
PRIME P weight ˆ / 1    for PRIME participants, 
                                                          MFI P ˆ / 1       for regular microfinance participants, and 
                                                          ) ˆ ˆ - 1 ( / 1 MFI PRIME P P     for non-participants, 
where 
PRIME P ˆ  = estimated probability of PRIME participation and  
MFI P ˆ  = estimated probability of regular microfinance participation.     33
Woolridge (1999) shows that weighting an outcome regression by the inverse of the 
sampling probabilities of program participation leads to appropriate estimators and 
efficiency gains that are better than what would have been possible using population weights.  
The results suggest that regular microfinance is as good as PRIME in mitigating both 
seasonal and year-round poverty, as well as in affecting other welfare indicators (Table 8).  
For example, PRIME participation increases monthly employment hours by 21 percentage 
points, compared to a 23 percentage-point gain for regular microfinance.  Similarly, PRIME 
reduces food deprivation (either starvation or meal rationing) during the non-monga period 
by 3.9 percentage points, which is slightly higher than the reduction with regular 
microfinance (3.5 percentage points).  The last column in Table 8 presents the Wald test 
statistics, which show that the differences between the impacts of alternate programs (i.e., 
PRIME versus regular microfinance) are not statistically significant for nearly all outcomes.   
 
7.  Do the Findings Differ with Panel Estimation Methods?  
 
The cross-sectional estimates of program effects are potentially subject to bias due to 
violation of assumptions employed in such techniques.  For example, the PSM method may 
not yield consistent estimates of program effects if unobserved characteristics of both 
villages and households influence program participation, and consequently, outcomes.  Thus, 
alternative methods must be explored to check the validity of the cross-sectional findings.   
   One way to verify the results is to use panel analysis.  Panel data at the household 
level can resolve the bias due to unobserved characteristics.  Panel analysis also helps control 
for common season-specific bias.  For example, when we examine the incidence of 
starvation or meal rationing for a particular season, we may invariably introduce a common 
seasonal effect, such as seasonal preference that affects both the participation decision and 
consumption.  It is also possible that a common seasonal shock could induce all households   34
in an area to behave in a certain way, independent of unobserved household heterogeneity, 
which would affect program participation.  That is, household consumption may be 
completely independent of seasonal variations and still co-vary strongly with the lean season, 
simply because of common season-specific shocks.  Resolving both sources of bias—
unobserved household- and village-level heterogeneity and common seasonal effects—
requires season-specific household panel data.    
  InM has pre-intervention baseline information for the target and non-target 
households from the PRIME villages only.  However, the data has limited information in 
terms of both explanatory variables and outcomes.  Table 9 presents the summary statistics 
of seasonal outcomes in 2005 and 2008 with the pre- and post-intervention data.  In the 
baseline data, we have only subjective measures of food deprivation by season as outcomes.
23  
In Table 9, we see that household welfare measured in terms of food deprivation improves 
between 2005 and 2008.  For example, the rate of occasional starvation during the lean 
(monga) season declined from 50.1 percent in 2005 to 45.2 percent in 2008, while the rate of 
occasional starvation during the non-monga season also decreased from 9.3 percent in 2005 
to 2.3 percent in 2008.  Year-round starvation similarly declined over this period.     
Fixed-effects or double difference method     
As we have more than one year of observation after the program intervention for the same 
season, we use a fixed-effects (FE) method to estimate the program effect.  With panel data 
available, we rewrite the outcome equation (5), as follows: 
ijst s j ij ijt ijt ijst p x y               ,         (11) 
where  
t = year and  
                                                       
23 However, we earlier found that the qualitative measures of deprivation are good approximations of 
quantitative measures of deprivation.    35
s  = season-specific FEs.   
For the two-year period, if we take the difference of equation (11) from the 2nd to 1st 
period, we eliminate the unobserved time-in-varying household, village, and seasonal 
common FEs; that is, 
ijs ij ij ijs p x y           ,           (12) 
where an FE method is used to estimate program effects on household outcomes.   
However, the above model (12) assumes that the selection bias is time-invariant, in which 
case the changes in outcome for non-participants reveal the counterfactual outcome 
changes.  Thus, the difference between the mean differences of participants and non-
participants is the impact estimate.  More formally, the simple FE or double difference (DD) 
compares treatment and comparison groups in terms of outcome changes over time relative 
to the outcomes observed for a pre-intervention baseline.  The FE allows for conditional 
dependence in the levels arising from additive time-invariant latent heterogeneity.   
DD PSM method  
The household fixed-effects method in equation (12) may not produce consistent estimates 
if household-level unobservables are time-varying.  For example, the initial conditions may 
be important enough to influence the outcomes later such that the FE or DD estimator is a 
biased estimate, since subsequent outcome changes are a function of initial conditions that 
also influenced program participation in the first place.  In this case, the selection bias is not 
constant over time, introducing a violation of the assumptions of the FE method.  It follows 
that controlling for the initial heterogeneity is critical to the creditability of the FE or DD 
method.  
   PSM is an obvious choice for cleaning out this initial heterogeneity prior to doing the 
differencing.  If there is no observable heterogeneity in the differences (i.e., it has been   36
cleaned out by differencing), then there is no gain from matching on top of FE.  Combining 
PSM for selecting the comparison group with FE can reduce (though probably not 
eliminate) the bias found in other evaluation methods, including single-difference matching.  
Since PSM optimally balances observed covariates between the treatment and comparison 
groups, it is a method of choice for selecting the comparison group in panel data studies.  
Obviously, one requires pre-intervention baseline information for the participants and non-
participants, which fortunately is available for the PKSF credit intervention program. 
  Following Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003), a weighted least squares regression 
that weights non-participants according to their propensity score can yield a fully efficient 
estimator in the following regression:  
  ijs ij ijs T x y          ,             (13) 
 where  
T = treatment status.   
The weights to be used in the above regression are 1 for treated households 
and ) 1 /( p p  for control observations, where  p is the estimated p-score using the PSM 
method in the pre-program baseline data. 
  Does PRIME have a role in reducing food deprivation in the case of panel data 
analysis?  Table 10 presents alternate estimates of PRIME effects, using two alternative 
methods: simple FE (or DD) using equation (12) and p-weighted FE using equation (13).  
Estimates with p-weighted FE are slightly lower than that with the simple FE method.  That 
is, the estimates are slightly lower when we control for the initial conditions in the FE 
method, which is expected.  Nonetheless, the estimates clearly show that PRIME reduces 
food deprivation in both lean and non-lean seasons.  For example, PRIME reduces the 
incidence of occasional starvation during the lean season by 5.4 percentage points and during   37
the non-lean season by 2.8 percentage points.  Consequently, PRIME reduces year-round 
starvation by 6.6 percentage points.   
Does the effect of PRIME differ from that of regular microfinance?  Table 11 
presents the estimates of the relative impacts of PRIME and regular microfinance on a 
household welfare set.
24  The impact estimates measure changes in household outcomes due 
to an intervention such as PRIME, given the availability of regular microfinance.  We find 
that the relative impacts of PRIME differ slightly from its absolute effects, shown in Table 
10.  Wald test statistics also show that the impacts of PRIME and regular microfinance differ 
significantly different for three out of six outcomes, unlike the cross-sectional results, which 
show no significant differences between the two impact estimates for most outcomes (Table 
8).   
The results suggest that PRIME reduces seasonal starvation by 5.5 percentage points 
during the lean season, compared to a 3.9 percentage point increase (statistically 
insignificant) due to regular microfinance programs.  Similarly, PRIME has a larger effect 
(7.2 percentage points) than regular microfinance programs (positive 3.5 percentage points, 
but statistically insignificant) on mitigating year-round starvation.  But regular microfinance 
has a larger role than PRIME in mitigating food deprivation generally (i.e., when starvation 
and meal rationing are combined).  Since the incidence of meal rationing is much higher than 
that of occasional starvation, we infer that regular microfinance has a relatively larger effect 
on reducing meal rationing than reducing the incidence of occasional starvation.
25  
                                                       
24 This is done by implementing the DD method by a p-weighted regression after extending the concept 
demonstrated in equation (13); that is, assigning a weight of 1 for participants in PRIME and MFIs and an 
inverse of the probability of non-participation for nonparticipants.  
25 It is possible that regular microfinance programs, because of their longer-term operation, are more suited to 
handling the general hardship associated with meal rationing than PRIME which helps alleviate more acute 
form of hardship (i.e., starvation). We re-ran the same regression with two types of microfinance memberships 
- those started before PRIME and those after PRIME (that is, after 2006). We find that longer exposure to   38
 
8.  Summary and Conclusion  
Microfinance is often criticized for not adequately addressing both seasonal and hard-core 
poverty in Bangladesh and elsewhere.  In response to such criticism, MFIs have introduced 
innovations in program design to address both concerns.  In Bangladesh, one such program, 
designed and implemented by PKSF is the so-called PRIME initiative.  Begun in 2006, 
PRIME targets the northwest region’s ultra-poor, who are most vulnerable to seasonality of 
income, employment, and consumption.  The program essentially offers microfinance 
services on flexible terms.  For example, PRIME provides consumption loans to address 
consumption seasonality, while regular MFIs offer seasonal production loans to deal with 
seasonality.   
This study evaluated the effectiveness of PRIME, relative to regular microfinance, in 
tackling seasonal and hard-core poverty in Bangladesh’s northwest region.  The results 
suggest that microfinance generally has reached a large percentage of the ultra-poor and 
seasonal poor in recent years.  It was found that about 62 percent of the ultra-poor 
participate in microfinance.  In contrast, 59 percent of the ultra-poor who experience 
occasional starvation and 63 percent of the ultra-poor with meal rationing are beneficiaries 
of microfinance.  The introduction of PRIME has only enhanced the ultra-poor’s 
participation in microfinance.  However, PRIME program placement and participation are 
not randomly given but are determined by a host of factors, including prior availability of a 
regular microfinance program.        
  Evaluating the program impact thus requires correction for the non-random 
placement/participation of a microfinance program.  An experimental evaluation design was 
                                                                                                                                                               
regular microfinance have higher impact on meal rationing than the shorter ones, thus confirming our 
assumption.          39
beyond the scope of the study.  Therefore, a quasi-experimental method was adopted to 
estimate the program effects.  The PSM method using cross-sectional data yields 
encouraging results for program participation.  The household FE method relying on panel 
data yields results that either support or augment the cross-sectional results.  
    Both PRIME and MFIs are found to reduce extreme poverty and seasonal 
deprivation.  MFI reduces extreme poverty by 2.3 percentage points, compared to 3.1 
percentage points under PRIME; while PRIME reduces seasonal deprivation by 3.9 
percentage points, compared to 3.5 percentage points with regular microfinance.  However, 
PRIME is found to reduce seasonal deprivation more than year-round poverty.  In contrast, 
MFIs affect chronic poverty more than seasonal poverty.  Yet the relative impact estimates 
of alternative programs (PRIME versus MFI) are not statistically significant with either 
cross-sectional or panel analysis.   
Do the results suggest that PRIME is just like a regular microfinance program?  It 
should be noted that, despite PRIME being a microfinance program, it is more popular than 
regular microfinance among the ultra-poor, perhaps because of its flexible design.  This is 
evidenced by the higher PRIME participation rate among the ultra-poor in areas where both 
types of programs operate.  As PRIME has been in operation only since 2006, it is perhaps 
too early to say whether PRIME equals or surpasses regular microfinance in tackling poverty 
and seasonality.  It is also not possible to confirm whether PRIME or microfinance more 
broadly can simultaneously tackle seasonality and chronic poverty in an efficient way.  
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Table 1: Poverty and extreme poverty incidence  







2000 2005 2000 2005 
Country  48.9 40 34.3  25.1 
Rural 52.3  43.8  37.9  28.6 
Urban 35.1  28.4  19.9  14.6 
Northwest (greater 
Rangpur) region  67.7 57.4 55.9 43.0 
Source: HIES surveys, 2000 and 2005. 
 
Table 2: Household participation rate (percent) in major monga-intervention programs in cross-
sectional sample 
Program type  Gaibandha  Kurigram Lalmonirhat Nilphamari Rangpur  All districts
PRIME area
PRIME   28.7 39.7 31.9 36.3 29.9  33.2
Regular 
microfinance 
37.2 30.0 36.9 25.5 35.5  33.8
Non-participants  34.1 30.3 31.2 38.2 34.6  33.0
Observations (no.)  1,257 1,135 1,015 490 692 4,589
Non-PRIME area
PRIME   0 - - 0 0  0
Regular 
microfinance 
6.3 - - 31.2 25.8  26.5
Non-participants  93.7 - - 68.8 74.2  73.5
Observations (no.)  64  0 0 314 240  618
All areas
PRIME   27.3 39.7 31.9 22.2 22.3  29.2
Regular 
microfinance 
35.7 30.0 36.8 27.7 33.0  33.0
Non-participants  37.0 30.3 31.3 50.1 44.7  37.8
Observations (no.)  1,321 1,135 1,015 804 932 5,207
Source: InM survey, 2009. 
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Household with year-round starvation or 


























































Household had starvation or meal rationing 



















Household had starvation or meal rationing 









Observations (no.) 1,520 1,717 1,970  5,207
Source: InM survey, 2009. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.    46
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Proportion of highland areas  

















Observations (no.) 1,520 1,717 1,970 5,207
Source: InM survey, 2009. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
 
Table 5: Household food-consumption pattern during monga by poverty status  
using cross-sectional sample 
Poverty status  Starvation (%)
 
Starvation or meal 
rationing (%) 
Consumption of 
full meals (%) 
Moderate poor   48.1 95.3 4.7
Moderate non-poor   28.8 84.2 15.8
Extreme poor   51.8 96.9 3.1
Extreme non-poor   31.8 87.2 12.8
Food poor  48.7 95.5 4.5
Food non-poor  28.5 84.6 15.4
Food poor during monga 47.6 95.6 4.4
Food non-poor during monga 20.2 72.5 27.5
Food poor during non-monga 48.9 95.5 4.5
Food non-poor during non-monga 32.1 87.5 12.5
Source: InM survey, 2009. 
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Table 6: Estimates of the determinants of program participation using  
MNL model and cross-sectional data of 2008–09 
Explanatory 
variable 
PRIME Regular   
microfinance 




Gender of household head (1 = M,  































































































Log likelihood   -5076.11
Observations (no.)  5,202
Source: InM survey, 2009.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  Coefficients are marginal impacts.    49
Table 7: Estimates of PRIME impacts using alternative cross-sectional methods  















































































































































Observations (no.) 1,974 3,388  3,490
Source: InM survey, 2009. 
Note: Figures outside parentheses are marginal impacts and those in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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Table 8: Estimates of alternate program effects (p-weighted regression method) 






PRIME and MFI 
coefficients 
Year-round outcomes





p>F = 0.988 





p>F = 0.006 





p>F = 0.715 





p>F = 0.538 





p>F = 0.084 





p>F = 0.853 





p>F = 0.309 





p>F = 0.853 





p>F = 0.554 





p>F = 0.611 





p>F = 0.309 







p>F = 0.924 
Seasonal outcomes





p>F = 0.258 







p>F = 0.775 







p>F = 0.572 







p>F = 0.931 





p>F = 0.538 
Household had starvation or meal rationing 






p>F = 0.695 







p>F = 0.224 
Household had starvation or meal rationing 






p>F = 0.808 
Observations (no.)  5,202  
Source: InM survey, 2009. 
Note: Regressions are OLS, except for binomial variables (poverty and starvation variables), where a probit 
model is used.  Figures outside parentheses are marginal impacts and those in parentheses are t-statistics.  
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Table 9: Summary statistics of household-level outcome indicators in panel sample 
Outcome variable (meal consumption pattern) 2005 2008
























Observations (no.)  4,517 4,517
Sources: InM surveys, 2006 and 2009. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. Outcome variables in panel estimation consist of 
household meal-consumption variables only, since only those variables are available in both years.  
         
            
 
Table 10: Estimates of PRIME impacts using household fixed-effects (FE) method  
Outcome variable (meal consumption pattern) FE  p-weighted 
FE 


























Households (no.)  2,991 2,991 
Sources: InM surveys, 2006 and 2009. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  A panel sample is constructed for households in program areas  
since a baseline survey was not conducted in non-program areas.       
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Table 11: Estimates of alternative program impacts  
(p-weighted FE) 
Outcome variable  




Wald test statistics 
for equality of 
PRIME and MFI 
coefficients 





p>F = 0.0008 







p>F = 0.147 





p>F = 0.768 







p>F = 0.071 





p>F = 0.0001 







p>F = 0.217 
Households (no.)  4,517  
Sources: InM surveys, 2006 and 2009. 
Note: Figures outside parentheses are marginal impacts and those in parentheses are t-statistics.  
  
 
 